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Unresolved tensions regarding the social compact that is the “new” South Africa – 
the South Africa that came into being in the period 1990 to 1996 after a nearly 
century-long struggle by the (mostly) black African majority against racial-impe-
rial disenfranchisement and oppression1 – burst to the surface at the start of 2015 
with the #RhodesMustFall campaign.2 The campaign started on 9 March 2015 
when a student, Chumani Maxwele, threw a bucket of faeces at the statue of Cecil 
John Rhodes on the campus of the University of Cape Town. The protest was 
motivated by the experience of oppression induced by the presence of the statue, 
as well as the groundswell of protest against what was identified as the vestiges 
of institutionalized racism in the University, race-based exclusionary practices 
preventing full participation in higher learning by disadvantaged black students, 
and colonial contents of curricula that entrenched colonial oppression of Africans. 
Protest gatherings led to the eventual removal of the statue from the university 
campus. The protest soon became violent with the occupation of university build-
ings, the burning of colonial era artworks, and spread to other universities.
Throughout South Africa in the course of 2015 there were instances of defac-
ing and vandalism of statues of figures representing South Africa’s colonial past: 
most prominently the statue of Queen Victoria in Port Elizabeth, King George 
V at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, and that of President Paul 
Kruger in Pretoria. Throughout 2015 and 2016 there have been constant violent 
protests, destruction of university property, and clashes between protesters and 
police and security personnel on various campuses. Perceptions of coloniality and 
epistemic violence in higher education – both in terms of curricula, academic 
campus culture, and financial exclusions of poor black students – soon saw the 
#RhodesMustFall campaign broaden out to a #FeesMustFall campaign (an at 
times violent protest against increasing university fees and shortages in student 
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funding), eventually to also embrace, since September 2016, a #ScienceMustFall 
campaign. The latter was explicitly aimed at overturning the enduring legacy of 
an epistemology (to wit: Western science and the canon of authors and discipli-
nary conventions derived from the First World) that, in the language of the protest 
movements, serves the ongoing economic, political, and intellectual enslavement 
of black South Africans.3 Hence the insistence on decolonializing higher educa-
tion and the curriculum.
In the public debates that ensued, connections were drawn between the “sym-
bolic, continued, existence of names, statues and sculptures left over from the 
colonial and Apartheid eras of South Africa” and how these “reflect the continued 
exclusion of different epistemologies of thought, different races, classes and gen-
der based oppressions.”4 The wave of rolling student protests was quickly located 
within a broader conversation across the nation that seeks to apply pressure on the 
political imagination of the present day:
It is a recurring theme in interpretive reflection on the #FeesMustFall 
protest movement that the protest should be understood in a wider con-
text. Commentators were quick to draw connections between protests 
against the varied and complex exclusions from higher education and 
training as avenues out of poverty, and a violent history of a hegem-
onic racially derived episteme. In one case the call for a curriculum that 
moved “beyond narrow Eurocentric confines to one which grants equal 
status and value to African and other epistemic traditions,” a lack charac-
terized as “implicit, epistemic violence,” is immediately tied to the fact 
that this experience of alienation in the context of students’ experiences 
of higher education is the manifestation of wider, encompassing failure 
of social integration – the fall of apartheid removed the legal system of 
racial discrimination but not the effects of it in the economic and devel-
opmental inequalities it left in its wake.5
The Rhodes, whose name lived on in the protest campaign, is Cecil John Rhodes 
(1853–1902), Anglo-South African mining magnate and politician who emigrated 
in 1870 from Britain to the then Colony of Natal, and made his fortune first on the 
diamond fields of the northern Cape and subsequently on the goldfields of the then 
South African Republic. He eventually made a successful political career as Prime 
Minister of the Cape Colony 1890 to 1896 (he had to resign as Prime Minister of 
the Cape Colony and from the British South Africa Company, the company that 
had the Royal Charter to found the new colony of Rhodesia, after the failed Jame-
son Raid into the South African Republic). During his term as Prime Minister he 
promulgated the Glen Grey Act that regulated voting rights for blacks as well as 
establishing “purely natives territories” in the Transkei region of the eastern Cape, 
thus prefiguring and laying the groundwork for the later infamous legislative acts 
that deprived rural blacks from their ancestral land.6
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Of importance in the context of this chapter are the “Confession of Faith” that 
Rhodes wrote in Oxford during a return to Britain to further his studies at Oxford 
University (dated 2 June 1877, reworked later that same year in Kimberley after 
his return from Britain), and his first will drawn up on 19 September 1877. In the 
“Confession” Rhodes expressed the desirability of establishing a secret society 
that will operate throughout the British Empire in all sectors of influence in order 
to further the political and economic interests of the British Empire, to bring the 
“whole uncivilised world” (sic) under British rule, to recover the United States 
into the British Empire so as to make the “Anglo-Saxon race” but one Empire. 
The first clause to the 1877 will begins:
To and for the establishment, promotion and development of a Secret 
Society, the true aim and object whereof shall be for the extension of 
British rule throughout the world, the perfecting of a system of emigra-
tion from the United Kingdom, and of colonisation by British subjects of 
all lands where the means of livelihood are attainable by energy, labour 
and enterprise, and especially the occupation by British settlers of the 
entire Continent of Africa, the Holy Land, the Valley of the Euphrates, the 
Islands of Cyprus and Candia, the whole of South America, the Islands 
of the Pacific not heretofore possessed by Great Britain, the whole of 
the Malay Archipelago, the seaboard of China and Japan, the ultimate 
recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the Brit-
ish Empire, the inauguration of a system of Colonial representation in 
the Imperial Parliament which may tend to weld together the disjointed 
members of the Empire and, finally, the foundation of so great a Power 
as to render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity.7
The will shows Rhodes to be a racist and an arch-imperialist, and it is in the con-
text of what he represented that one should understand the current emerging dis-
cursive reconstruction of South African society, for the industrial capitalism that 
Rhodes helped found in South Africa in the late 19th century laid the groundwork 
for the whole social catastrophe that was apartheid-directed socially engineered 
South African society in the 20th century. To summarize a complex history, as 
I have done elsewhere, the history of apartheid as a social engineering project for 
the purpose of the disenfranchisement and economic exploitation of black South 
Africans along racial lines is not to be understood outside of the framework of the 
arrival, imposition, and growth of a capitalist economy in South Africa.8
The imposition of industrial capitalism after the discovery of gold and 
the establishment of the first mining concessions in what soon became 
the city of Johannesburg (1884–1886) fundamentally changed what was 
(and remained so until well past the formation of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910 and the First World War) an agricultural, colonial-set-
tler economy surrounding an “island of intense industrialisation” on 
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the Witwatersrand with some pockets of industrial activity elsewhere. 
Gold attracted an imperial class of venture capitalists that quickly both 
concentrated financial power but also simultaneously expanded into 
an interconnected series of industries – South Africa was industrialis-
ing around mineral exports (“South Africa emerged from the British 
Empire as an export enclave” in the service of the Empire, so Keith 
Hart and Vishnu Padayachee).9 The imposition of industrial capitalism 
set in motion a process of fairly rapid economic transformation through 
expanding industrialisation, rapid urbanisation, and fundamental socio-
cultural transformations among the newly urbanised population. To 
achieve and maintain the profitability of the mining-led industrial revo-
lution (mainly) on the Witwatersrand, a raft of legislation was needed 
in order to construct a “cheap labour economy.” The three main legs 
of this raft of legislation were political disenfranchisement of blacks, 
land ownership regulations, and job reservations along racial lines.10 To 
grossly simplify a long and complicated social history, the net effect of 
the economic demand for legislative social engineering was the destruc-
tion of the black agricultural peasantry, large-scale urbanisation among 
both poor whites and blacks with a concomitant emergence of mixed-
race slums, and a long-going cultural modernising project among the 
black urban populations.11 Thus, apartheid was a means for excluding 
black South Africans both from profiting from the new modes of produc-
tion and relations to economic factors, and from their simultaneously 
disrupted traditional cultural values. The core accusation voiced in the 
current protests is that the arrival of democracy did not substantially cor-
rect this alienation.12
Thus, according to self-interpretations arising from the chorus of voices in the 
various #FeesMustFall movements, it is the legacy of this long socially defining 
process that has now come to roost. Ergo, the discourse of symbolic violence 
of the recent student unrest as it unfolded over the past two years suggests an 
interlinkage between history (as in internalized, experienced history, interpreted 
history), symbols of the past as the sites for contestations about the interpretation 
of history, and social formations.13 If the unrest started with a focus on the statue 
of Cecil John Rhodes (and then extended to other similar symbols) as a symbol of 
a particular meaning-laden past, and had this symbolic meaning as its driving 
core (even as it fed into the follow-up rounds of protests), one may interpret the 
“symbolic revolution” through the concept of the instrumentality of history, or 
history-as-myth.
The phrase “history-as-myth” in the context of the argument pursued here 
encapsulates Roland Barthes’s understanding of myth in “Myth Today.”14 Myth 
is not a simple system of ordinary or primary signification, but rather a secondary 
system of signification in which the sign, that is the combination of signifier-
signified, itself becomes a signifier, that is, through a process of signification by 
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means of association and connotation. “Mythology takes this sign and turns it into 
a signifier for a new signified, a new concept . . . Myth, then, transforms first-order 
meanings into second-order meanings.”15 Furthermore, this is not a neutral pro-
cess of signification, but politically charged in that the political operates through 
mythologizing – specific power structures in society induce the particular associa-
tions and connotations that construct the myth. While myths have the capacity to 
disguise their own historicity and to present themselves as objective and natural 
(and hence become the site for the operation of ideology), it is precisely in disag-
gregating and fracturing social contexts that myths become dehistoricized as sites 
of social contestation.
It is therefore that the second part of the heading to this section, “discourse and 
the reconstruction of society,” deliberately evokes the title of the well-known and 
influential 1989 monograph of Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of 
Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification.16 While Lincoln 
offers no definition of discourse in the book, it becomes clear from the assembled 
examples that discourse as a statement of “so things are” arises from an ensemble 
of operations, viz. symbolic-mythologizing (not only as the significatory practice 
itself – discourse assigns meaning – but also contestations regarding institutional-
ized significations); ritual practices – ranges of formalized actions that establish 
or set assigned meanings and interpretation in place; and classifications as estab-
lishments of hierarchies of authority. Since discourse is itself the product of the 
ability to define how things are and to arrange hierarchies of authority, it goes 
almost without saying that discourse is an operation of power and force (force 
understood here as the ability to enforce, to induce, which exercise of the ability 
ranges from persuasion, to threat, to coercion, to violence).17 Hence, inducement 
and enforcement have as their constant counterparts, resistance, rebellion, and 
revolution – social discourse is the collective noun for the manifold manners and 
sites of interplay between both sides of the power divide.
Constructing a groundwork for comparison: destructions 
of religious symbols in the Spanish Civil War
While Bruce Lincoln, in the essay “Revolutionary Exhumations in Spain,” 
highlights the millennialist subversion of conventional orders of discourse and 
practice during the Spanish Civil War, mainly new habits of conduct and social 
organization among the Left Republicans, coupled with the “symbolic revolution” 
expressed in destruction and profanation of churches, killing of clerics, and exhu-
mations of mummies of deceased priests and nuns, for the purposes of making 
this comparison more fruitful in the context of the introductory paragraph on the 
various #[Enter]MustFall campaigns in South Africa, it is useful to highlight in 
highly summary manner some salient features of Spanish history leading up to the 
conflict between revolutionaries and guardians of the old order in revolutionary 
Spain 1936 to 1939 as a comparandum by means of which to reimagine religious 
violence as “symbolic revolution.”18
T H E  U S E F U L N E S S  O F  V I O L E N T  E N D S
287
In the course of the roughly century and a half, between 1805 and 1936, Spanish 
history pulled in two opposing directions:19 simultaneously deeply traditionalist-
monarchist and developing a liberal tradition (in the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
wars and under influence of the French post-Revolution tradition, the Constitution 
of 1812 was an attempt to limit the power of the monarch and to establish a liberal 
state).20 In effect the military coup of July 1936 that unleashed the civil war set in 
motion a series of culture wars: urban culture and cosmopolitan lifestyles versus 
rural tradition; secular against religious; authoritarianism against liberal politi-
cal cultures; centre versus periphery; traditional gender roles versus the “new 
woman”; even youth against age, since generational conflicts were also present.21
Since the middle of the 19th century a steady industrialization and modern-
izing of the economy (mainly centred on cities like Madrid, Toledo, Zaragoza, 
and Barcelona, as well as the agricultural region around Valencia) occurred in 
the midst of what was still basically an agrarian economy founded on large lati-
fundia (from which base the landowner class exerted considerable influence on 
the organization of the state; the landed oligarchy occupied most important gov-
ernment positions), itself standing on the back of a large peasantry perpetually 
surviving on the edge of starvation (brought on by a tradition of monoculture 
which meant insufficient harvest-incomes and deepening states of indebtedness 
of the peasantry).22
In the period, Spain was characterized by a fairly rapid urbanization with con-
comitant rise in modernized urban populations, professional organizations, and 
labour movements, all contributing to the growing cleavage between urban and 
rural Spain; and a short-lived economic growth period after the First World War 
coming to an end in the 1930s in the wake of the Great Depression. Nevertheless, 
the changes in social constitution of Spanish society (along with better communi-
cations and transport and the relatively freer circulation of new ideas) also brought 
with them increasing clamour for a political voice.23 “The drama of liberal gov-
ernment in nineteenth-century Spain lay especially in the fact that no other coun-
try in the world made such persistent efforts to introduce such advanced political 
forms amid similar conditions of social and economic underdevelopment. Such 
premature liberalism had seemed destined to fail.”24 These democratizing move-
ments came into conflict with the landowning class who resisted change when the 
Republican Socialist government attempted anything approximating land reform – 
“the reforms raised opposition among Spain’s traditional elites.”25
Politically, in the course of this tumultuous and turbulent century and a half, 
there had been, as well, a conflict regarding the legitimate line of succession in the 
royal house of Bourbon (between the Alfonsine and Carlist lines), popular upris-
ings against the ultra-conservatism of the monarchy and the establishment of the 
First Republic (1873 to 1874; ending with the restoration of the Bourbon monar-
chy); a number of military pronunciamentos and coups (a pronunciamento was a 
declaration by the military that the government has lost the ability to govern and 
this usually led to the formation of a new government);26 and the establishment of 
semi-dictatorial regimes under the monarchy ending in 1931 with the abdication 
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of Alfonso XIII and the establishment of the Second Republic (1931 to 1939) 
under a Socialist government.
Two political forces played a central role in the unfolding of the civil war: the 
army and the Catholic Church. While the army itself at times played protector 
of liberal values, the loss of the remainders of the Spanish Empire (earlier in the 
19th century, Spain lost all of its South American colonies, including Mexico, to 
liberation movements; 1898 to 1899 saw the loss of Cuba, Haiti, Puerto Rico, the 
Philippines, and Guam to the United States of America after the Spanish-Ameri-
can War), and with it the colonial markets for economic exploitation, caused deep 
and long-during disaffection among the military class for the political classes in 
mainland Spain, resulting in a call “to make Spain great again.” Thus during the 
political radicalization of the two decades leading up to the civil war, and under 
the onslaught of a Manichean dualist rhetoric of the opposition-as-enemy, the 
armed forces (who themselves did not initially form a unified front, ideologically 
or organizationally) steadily drifted Rightwards.
The Catholic Church, having been deeply enmeshed with the monarchical 
order in Spain for centuries, regarded itself as the guardian of traditionalism – 
the bulwark against the “consequences of encroaching political liberalism and 
cultural pluralism, both of which profoundly challenged its own monopoly on 
truth,”27 and hence also as guardian of the landed patrician order in the rural, 
mainly agricultural districts. As a result, it had already begun to experience large-
scale rejection by the peasantry who regarded the Church as complicit in their 
oppression, as well as by the industrial proletariat in the urban environments. 
The Catholic Church’s response to this was the “apocalyptic tone” to the pastoral 
letter of the Cardinal Primate on 1 May 1931 which was an “incendiary royalist 
homily” calling on the faithful to mobilize in “spiritual and patriotic rearmament” 
coming close to declaring the Republic an illegitimate regime. Other bishops 
went further and actually described the Republic as the triumph of error and sin 
(the same dualist apocalyptic tone characterized discourse among the military as 
society radicalized).28 As the Republican government set about its programme 
of re-engineering Spanish society, to a large extent the Catholic Church became 
the central focus of the cultural wars escalating in the country. The final break 
between the Catholic Church and the Republican government arose from the lat-
ter’s policy of cultural modernization, laicization, and secularization – an attempt 
to subordinate the position and influence of the Church to that of the secular state. 
In this pursuit the Republicans rode a wave of anticlericalism – “As seculariza-
tion increased, anticlericalism became the principal common denominator of the 
left. By the 1930s Spain had become a partially secularized country and thus had 
entered the ‘danger zone’ of cultural change in which religious conflict would 
become most intense.”29
Anticlericalism took the practical shape, in the Republican programme of 
political reforms, of restrictions posed on the public expression of Church life, 
particularly the right to teach. Other restrictions regarded economic activity by 
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the Church, public demonstrations of religion, even the wearing of religious 
symbols like crucifixes by women, and in addition, the Society of Jesus was 
dissolved.30 While in earlier times Church property had also been targeted for 
vandalism or destruction, with the maelstrom leading to the war gathering apace, 
very early in the life of the new Republic, “Catholic churches and buildings 
became targets of arson and mob destruction in the famous quema de conven-
tos [burning of the convents] of 11–12 May 1931,” which saw more than 100 
buildings torched and sacked in Madrid and several cities of the south and east, 
destroying also priceless libraries and art. In the course of the civil war the war 
against the Church escalated, with numerous clerics killed, churches profaned, 
church rituals inverted in carnivalesque reversals, symbols destroyed (e.g., in 
Barcelona, Madrid, Toledo, Valencia, Almeria, Ripoll, and Vich)31 – inter alia, 
the exhumations of Lincoln’s description, and the most infamous of all events: 
the “execution” of the Sacred Heart of Jesus by Communist militiamen (Monu-
ment of the Sacred Heart on the Cerro de los Angeles, a hill a few miles south 
of Madrid which is regarded as the exact centre of Spain).32 In areas controlled 
by Republicans, especially the more radical groups like POUM (Partido Obrero 
de Unificación Marxista = Worker’s Party of Marxist Unification) in Barcelona, 
a social revolution was set in motion by peasants and workers who collectiv-
ized farms, factories, and businesses of all sizes, including public services and 
transport. Culturally, the social revolution took the shape of new ways of address 
that stressed equality, even to the promotion of “free love.” Thus, in enacting 
millenarian antinomianism, local radicals who burnt and desecrated churches, 
profaned religious symbols, and exacted a kind of genocide on religious person-
nel, sought to overturn a dominant cultural formation that had been structured by 
the discourses of religion, honour, and patronage and had legitimated relations 
of inequality for centuries.33
It is this utopian inversion of the conventional order of things, in which “secu-
lar ideologies functioned as politico-ideological substitutes for religion,”34 that 
evoked the strong reaction from the range of conservative forces on the Right, in 
which “the wars of religion, which had never afflicted sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Spain, arrived in modern form in the 1930s with a vengeance. . . . Only 
as a kind of religious warfare can the intensity of the clerical–anticlerical conflict 
in Spain be understood.”35 The eschatological–millenarian ritual destruction and 
desecration of churches, shrines, statues, religious artworks, and the looting of 
church treasures, were seen as an assault on the public presence of Catholicism 
and the emotional power it still held over the population.36 As a commentator on 
the times, Father Antonio Montero Moreno put it: the material destruction of “the 
sacred” unveiled “a rage against the religious world far more significant than if 
the killed are men of flesh and bone.”37
As Spain descended into chaos, there were extrajudicial killings, executions, 
and assassinations on both sides, Republican and Nationalist; and both sides trum-
peted news – real and fake – to show up the other as illegitimate and insurrectionist. 
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The language hardened on both sides: following the coup in July 1936, from vari-
ous constituencies on the Right came the message that
Spain needed to be purged or purified. Sometimes they even spoke of the 
need for a blood sacrifice. These kinds of sentiments unleashed a sav-
age repression that happened from the outset everywhere in rebel Spain, 
including in many areas where the military rebels were in control from 
the start, where there was no armed resistance, no political resistance to 
speak of either, no “front,” no advancing or retreating troops – in short, 
where there was no “war” according to a conventional definition of the 
term. What there was, however, was a culture war that the perpetrators 
carried in their heads. The coup had sanctioned its unleashing and thus 
opened the way to mass murder.38
On the Left the revolutionaries were equally convinced that they were carrying 
out a quasi-religious task:
“We have rounded up all the priests and parasites. . . . We have lit our 
torches and applied the purifying fire to all the churches . . . and we have 
covered the countryside and purified it of the plague of religion,” boasted 
the anarchist mouthpiece Solidaridad Obrera. And a similar mysticism 
of cathartic annihilation could be found in the words of an FAI member 
to a priest, before setting the latter’s church on fire: “Can you see this 
lamp burning day and night in front of the tabernacle as a sign of love? 
Well, now, with the flame of this lamp, we’re going to set fire to the 
church and thus purify the world of the lies you priests have dissemi-
nated.” Priests were killed, temples were destroyed, ultimately because 
of the need to eradicate the enemy within, to purge society of strange, 
pernicious elements, and to attain a simple, popular, feasible solution to 
the problems posed by the war and the revolution.39
Both sides to the conflict fought the civil war on the belief that they were 
fighting their own Armageddon, the end-time apocalyptic conflict. On the Right, 
Falangist fascism was called on to “save civilization.” In fact, within the Right, 
in Nationalist Spain – those parts controlled by the Nationalists – the conflict 
was interpreted as a “re-Christianization of Spain.”40 The Nationalist side inter-
preted the conflict as end-time conflict through images from the book of Revela-
tion: José M. Pemán brings the apocalyptic symbolism of Revelation to bear in 
his Poema de la Bestia y el Ángel (Poem of the Beast and the Angel), in which 
he writes: “The smoke of incense and the smoke of cannons, which rise to the 
feet of God, together constitute a single affirmation of our faith and, besides, of 
our promise to save a world and restore a civilization.”41 After the civil war had 
already started, the Catholic Church reacted to the revolutionary violence enacted 
on it by the broad variety of Leftist forces: first, the “Pastoral Instruction of the 
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Bishops of Pamplona and Vitoria” censuring Basque Catholics’ alliance with the 
“enemies of the Church”; then the Pope himself, in an address to 500 Spanish 
refugees on 14 September 1936, showed sympathy with the Nationalist cause; 
followed by the Bishop of Salamanca, Enrique Pla y Deniel’s pastoral letter “Las 
dos ciudades” of 30 September in which he referred to the military uprising as “a 
Crusade against the children of Cain . . . a Crusade for religion, for the fatherland, 
for civilization”;42 the booklet El caso de España by the Primate of Spain (Car-
dinal Isidro Goma) of 23 November; and the famous “Joint Letter of the Spanish 
Bishops to the Bishops of the Whole World Concerning the War in Spain” of 1 
July 1937, turned the Nationalist insurrection against the Republicans into a reli-
gious crusade.43
On the Republican side the conflict was cast as a fight against a fearsome apoc-
alyptic monster: “a bloodthirsty dragon, its skin covered with the symbols of fas-
cism and its three heads representing the three sworn enemies of the people – the 
rich, the military and the clergy” – the contents of a political poster published in 
the Catalan satirical magazine, L’Esquella de la Torratxa, 18 September 1936.44 
The combination of the rich, the military, and the clergy as the triad of oppres-
sive forces, regularly appears in propaganda posters, like the well-known poster, 
Los Nacionales (The Nationals) attributed to Juan Antonio Morales, and issued 
by the Ministerio de Propaganda, which depicts a warship with a military officer 
(wearing a blue Nationalist fascist sash); a wealthy bourgeois businessman with a 
Swastika lapel badge; a corpulent Catholic cleric; and coloured Spanish Moroc-
can soldiers, feared for their cruelty and fierceness, but also evoking the origins of 
the military insurrection – in the Spanish overseas legions of the Spanish Moroc-
can army; in the midst of it all a gallows symbolizing the death wrought by their 
hegemony and political reactionary.45
On the Republican side a millenarian mindset interpreted mass killings as achiev-
ing a tabula rasa, while on the Nationalist, rebel, side the killings were seen as “a 
cleansing action designed to rid the community of sources of ‘pollution’ and the 
dangers they supposed.”46 On both sides, people of all ages and conditions fell victim 
to this “cleansing” (although it has to be pointed out that, for all the destruction and 
bloodletting, the destruction and killings were mainly concentrated in the first six 
months of the civil war; thereafter, arguably, issues of survival and eventual military 
success took precedence). But for the Nationalist forces, the cleansing or purification 
concerned people who symbolized cultural change and thus non-traditionalist under-
standings of mores, values, and behaviour: progressive teachers, intellectuals, self-
educated workers, and “new” women. Falangist violence was targeted against the 
socially, culturally, and sexually different.47 In addition, in Nationalist-Falangist ter-
ritories there was equally a religious crusade, this time aimed at Protestant churches. 
In the view of the Right, Protestantism was a plague that needed to be cleansed.
Ironically, if the desecration and profanation of religious symbols and icons 
had as its purpose to demonstrate their mere artifact-ness and lifelessness, then 
these acts of desecration “seemed at the same time to reveal a basic, almost magi-
cal belief in their might and the necessity to escape from their influence at any 
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cost.”48 There is, again, in this the matter of the experience of the living history 
embedded in the symbols of a social order that fueled the sentiments of height-
ened aversion not only to the symbols themselves but also what they stood for – 
the myth of a Catholic Spain. Thus, all the actors on the stage of the Spanish 
Civil War were caught on either side between deconstruction and reassertion of 
the social order.
Not to put too fine a point to it: in a context of increasing economic insecurity, an 
uncompleted social and economic revolution which left heightened expectations 
unfulfilled (even as exactly these evoked strong resistance from more conserva-
tive sectors of society), when the social fabric finally tore, it was the predominant 
symbolic order – the Catholic Church and all it stood for: the old oligarchic order; 
the entrenchment of monarchic authoritarian privileges and protections of the 
obtaining economic hierarchies; and its cultural and ideological hegemony over 
society, severely hampering social progress, democratization, and modernization – 
that became the focus of the ideologies operative in the Spanish Civil War on both 
sides. In this, I would contend, lies a powerful comparative moment to think the 
current symbolic revolutions with that play out in South Africa.
Figure 12.1  The apocalyptic monster cornered by the Republican forces. It appeared in the 
satirical magazine, L’Esquella de la Torratxa, 18 September 1936, 536–537. 
The caption (which unfortunately runs across the fold in the page and is dif-
ficult to read) says something like: “Come on, Comrades, the beast is already 
cornered.”
Source: http://mdc2.cbuc.cat/cdm/compoundobject/collection/esquella/id/22670/rec/2983
Figure 12.2  Los Nacionales (The Nationals), attributed to Antonio Morales, issued by the 
Ministerio de Propaganda.
Source: https://lts.brandeis.edu/research/archives-speccoll/spanishcivilwar/posters.html
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Christianity emerging on the border between the classical 
and post-classical worlds: three vignettes
In the two preceding case studies, long-standing social tensions became acute 
in the context of sudden ruptures in the social fabric. If the symbolic revolu-
tions discussed above are concretely situated in contexts of social disaggregation 
that resulted from severe reorganizations in social positionality among classes, 
groups, and institutionalized interests (and hence the eruptions of violence going 
with it – sentiments of affinity and disaffection act as the affective motor for vio-
lent behaviour), the 4th century CE as the century of the Christianization of the 
Roman Empire, the so-called Constantinian Revolution, was a more gradual pro-
cess. Or, better put it, the evidence seems to suggest a more complex process of 
change that at times and in specific contexts, erupted in violence directed at reli-
gious artifacts, symbols, and institutions. I highlight these slow-moving changes 
in order to profile the symbolic revolutions that mark aspects of religious change 
in the Late Roman Empire.
The big religious and cultural revolution that was the Christianization of the 
late Roman Empire did not arrive out of the blue, out of nothing – it was the cul-
mination of a series of cultural shifts of long duration:
a) Transitions from inspired oracular speech to book-centred religious dis-
courses (Judaism, Christianity, Manichaeism – to name only the three most 
prominent, but strands of Buddhism had also made its presence felt in the late 
antique world – were characterized not only by the development of extensive 
canons of religious literature, but also by the rise of a class of expert com-
mentators, which commentaries themselves came to constitute a library of 
religious resources);
b) Transitions from concrete, material, imagistic instantiations of divine pres-
ence to aniconic conceptions of divinity with concomitant new ways of 
mediating the divine: for instance, in the rise of various permutations of Neo-
platonic theurgic and religious philosophies and practices, mysticism, and 
so on – outside of Christianity in Late Roman Neoplatonic philosophy and 
theurgy, itself a kind of ascetical gymnastics; in the rise of Jewish mysticism 
out of the intersection of Persian-derived apocalyptic discourses and “verti-
cal” apocalyptic-cum-visionary traditions; and within Christianity with the 
emergence of asceticism as training for divine vision and full-blown mysti-
cism ranging from Origen, Evagrius Ponticus, and Gregory of Nyssa, and the 
6th-century mystic (pseudo-) Dionysius the Aereopagite, who drew on these 
earlier writers. In this regard, the monotheism of Christianity was a manifes-
tation of the wider drift towards monotheism in the Late Roman world;49
c) Transitions from priestly classes of religious hierarchies to hermeneutic spe-
cialists (rabbinic and Christian teacher-theologians – even as they existed 
alongside a broad spectrum of popular religious practitioners, holy men, healers- 
diviners, etc. – constituted as class the new intellectual force determining the 
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shape of Christian discourses but also their relation to and intersection with 
secular authority);
d) Transitions from monocultural, singular ethnic social entities, and identity 
formations to international, multiethnic, and geographically dispersed popu-
lations of post-ancient religious communities held together not only by shared 
symbols, beliefs, and practices, but also by itinerant leaders and mobile texts, 
incorporation into which occurred through practices of conversion as a habit-
uated new comportment with newly emerging social and identity formations;
e) And finally, transformations of the relationships between religious institu-
tions and the hegemonic hierarchies organizing various social aggregates 
in the post-ancient or late antique world, that is, an emerging independence 
inhering in religious institutions vis-à-vis the state (the Christian church, 
conceived of an independent identity, exerted its social agency vis-à-vis the 
Roman state);50
f ) And on the other side, and for our purposes here perhaps as important, the 
long survival, in new shapes and forms, of Graeco-Roman religious concepts 
and images (some examples by way of extremely abbreviated shorthand): 
Horus, the son of Isis, in the image of the baby Christ cradled in the arms 
of the holy Mother, similarly with the young Dionysus cradled in the lap of 
Hermes framed by an image of Theogonia and gift-bearing Dōrophoroi in 
the famous Dionysus mosaic of Sepphoris – evidence of a two-way street 
of impact between Graeco-Roman culture and emerging Christianity?;51 the 
transformations of Cybele/Magna Mater and Isis into the Mother of God 
of Christianity;52 the identification of Graeco-Roman deities with Christian 
religious figures, for instance, and, for our context here significant, Sarapis 
as Joseph in Alexandria, or the Buddha as the Christian saint Josaphat in 
Johannes Damascenus’s Barlaam and Josaphat;53 Middle- and Neoplato-
nism, along with Stoicism, as important philosophical frameworks informing 
Christian theological discourses;54 the “easy coexistence” of Dionysus, the 
“pre-eminent pagan god of Late Antiquity” (Bowersock),55 and the Christian 
myth in the work of Nonnus of Panopolis, the author of simultaneously the 
massively encyclopedic epic, the Dionysiaca, the eminent archive of Greek 
and Roman mythology at the acme of Graeco-Roman culture, and the versi-
fied version of the Gospel of John, the Paraphrase of St. John.56
As a paradigmatic example in the broader context of the argument pursued here, 
the case of Nonnus is particularly instructive. Distinguishing “pagan” from Chris-
tian writers in Late Antiquity runs aground on the rocks of the easy comportment 
in both directions with enduring classical paideia, as Jitse Dijkstra puts it with 
regard to Nonnus:
Whereas the idea that these intellectuals formed a “pagan resistance” 
against Christianity in this period has found widespread acceptance, it 
has now been firmly rejected in favour of a more complex model of 
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coexistence and interaction. No doubt there were some intellectuals who 
still adhered to the traditional cults and practices, but they were few and 
we should not confuse the extraordinary flourish of Hellenism in late 
antique Egypt with “paganism.”57
As Dijkstra elaborates on the coexistence of “pagan” and Christian discourses: 
“[T]he religious transformation of Late Antiquity is seen as a dynamic and grad-
ual process in which religions interacted in various, complex ways rather than 
that it was dominated by a stark Christian-‘pagan’ conflict.”58 Intellectuals on 
both sides of the divide shared in a widespread tendency towards classicizing 
literature. Thus Tim Whitmarsh could typify the period as one where becoming 
Christian did not
necessarily mean rejecting other forms of religious practice. Some Chris-
tians were borderline Jews. Even after Christianity became Rome’s state 
religion in the fourth century AD, many still clung to the old ways. . . . 
Polytheism and Christianity could exist side by side without any obvious 
friction. . . . A fourth-century Roman called Firmicus Maternus wrote 
both an astrological work that treated the planets as traditional Roman 
deities and an anti-pagan tract On the Error of Profane Religions. Did he 
convert in the interim, as scholars tend to assume? [The same question 
put to the religious identity of Nonnus of Panopolis in earlier scholar-
ship] Maybe, but maybe he simply saw no great contradiction. . . . It was, 
as one scholar has put it, “easy to be a Christian and something else.”59
Thus, reading the evidence from outside the triumphalist framework character-
izing early Christian writers on the nature and fate of “paganism,” one is left 
with the unavoidable impression, now strongly asserted in Late Antique scholar-
ship, of the interpenetration of “paganism” and Christianity.60 In spite of earlier 
scholarly convention of seeing a revitalized “pagan” resistance to Christianity 
among the Roman aristocracy, the reality was more one of relatively harmonious 
coexistence, in part due to class conformance on both sides (the cultural classiciz-
ing result of Graeco-Roman paideia – “pagan and Christian shared an increas-
ingly conventionalized language of discourse . . . about the divine milieu”61), 
but also because of increasing intermarriage (the Roman aristocracy gradually 
Christianized).62 Translated to the religious programme of Constantine, insofar as 
any existed, the question is to which extent Constantine enacted a deliberate pro-
gramme of Christianization (and if he really did enact legislation against “pagan” 
religious practices and institutions – the evidence from the Theodosian Code is 
ambiguous).63 Even with respect to his conversion the evidence for Constantine is 
not straightforward – what constituted the vision that was the basis of his conver-
sion, and how is one to “read” his own biography of gradual Christianization?64 
Nevertheless, in spite of Constantine expressing a wish for the complete cessation 
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of “pagan” religious culture, he pragmatically elected to follow a “policy of con-
temptuous toleration”:65
Let no one use what they have received by inner conviction to the detri-
ment of another. Rather, let everyone as far as possible apply what they 
have seen and understood to the benefit of their neighbor. . . . It is one 
thing voluntarily to undertake the contest for immortality, it is quite 
another to compel others to do so from fear of punishment . . . since 
I understand that some people are saying that the rites of the temples and 
the power of darkness have been entirely removed. I would indeed have 
earnestly recommended such removal to all mankind, were it not that the 
rebellious spirit of those wicked errors still remains obstinately fixed in 
the minds of some to the detriment of the common good.66
In Eusebius’s rendering of the account, Constantine only forbade governors and 
magistrates from offering sacrifices (the pre-eminent grounds being their use for 
divination or the “false arts”).67 Constantine’s further role in promoting Christian-
ity was the ordering of an extensive church building programme (famously, he 
turned the holy land into a Christian theme park with his lavish building projects). 
His successors would be more explicit in discouraging and forbidding “pagan” 
religious practices: as the combined legislation by the sons of Constantine (appeal-
ing to Constantine) has it:
Bloody spectacles are not suitable for civil ease and domestic quiet. 
Wherefore since we have proscribed gladiators, those who have been 
accustomed to be sentenced to such work as punishment for their crimes, 
you should cause to serve in the mines, so that they may be punished 
without shedding their blood. Constantine Augustus.68
It is necessary that the privileges which are bestowed for the cultiva-
tion of religion should be given only to followers of the Catholic faith. 
We desire that heretics and schismatics be not only kept from these privi-
leges, but be subjected to various fines. Constantine Augustus.69
It is decreed that in all places and all cities the temples should be 
closed at once, and after a general warning, the opportunity of sinning be 
taken from the wicked. We decree also that we shall cease from making 
sacrifices. And if anyone has committed such a crime, let him be stricken 
with the avenging sword. And we decree that the property of the one 
executed shall be claimed by the city, and that rulers of the provinces be 
punished in the same way, if they neglect to punish such crimes. Con-
stantine and Constans Augusti.70
Superstition shall cease; the madness of sacrifices shall be abolished. 
For if any man in violation of the law of the sainted emperor, Our father, 
and in violation of this command of Our Clemency, should dare to 
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perform sacrifices, he shall suffer the infliction of a suitable punishment 
and the effect of an immediate sentence.71
And yet, in spite of withdrawing state support for the traditional cults, and letting 
cult sites slide into benign neglect, and in spite of what amounted to legislation 
against the continuity of classical tradition (with all that this stood for: after all, 
partly in the name of this classical tradition Christians were persecuted), the very 
laws codified in the Theodosian Code reflect a grudging awareness that traditional 
religion persisted and that sacrifices did continue.72 John of Ephesus, the Syrian 
Monophysite bishop of Ephesus, describes in his Ecclesiastical History his mis-
sionary work in the provinces of Asia, Caria, Lydia, and Phrygia, and how he 
found a well-organized and deeply entrenched “pagan” culture centred on the big 
temple of the Isodromian Mother near Tralles in Caria.73 A law of 9 April 423 CE 
requires “the pagans who have survived” to follow recent legislation, adding that 
“although we would like to believe there be no [pagans] left any longer.”74 A later 
law of 14 November 435 CE sets harsher conditions:
We interdict all persons of a hardened pagan mind because of the 
accursed immolation of victims and the condemned sacrifices and the 
other acts forbidden by the authority of the ancient sanctiones. We order 
all their groves, temples, and precincts, if they remain intact even now, to 
be destroyed by the decree of the magistrates [of the cities] and cleansed 
by the erection of the revered sign of the Christian religion [the cross].75
In contrast to earlier regulations, now the traditional sacred sites had to be 
destroyed and exorcized by the sign of the cross. And indeed, numerous tem-
ples and sacred sites of the old traditional religions were destroyed, not only by 
civic authorities but also by Christian monks and local bishops emboldened by 
the anti-“pagan” legislation emanating from the Christian court. What makes this 
large-scale erasure of traditional religion from the landscape of the Later Roman 
Empire remarkable is that it took place in a context where Christianity was, at the 
time of Constantine’s conversion, a minority religion in the Empire (some calcu-
lations put it at 10% of the population). Witness a locality like Gaza in Palestine, 
where eight pagan temples stood against the one Christian church at the time 
when, under the leadership of the bishop of Gaza, Porphyrius, the temples were 
destroyed and burnt (in the year 402) in what can only be described as a minority 
incursion. This is apart from the many cases of temple conversions where “pagan” 
temples were reused as churches, like the famous Pantheon in Rome. Even so, 
a number of cult sites and temples remained open and in cultic business, like 
the Asklepieion in Athens, the temples at Carrhae-Harran, and the Isis temple at 
Philae. That it was not only a case of oversight is shown by the fact that Christian 
emperors could indeed also decree the reopening of “pagan” sanctuaries: in 382 
CE Theodosius allowed a pagan temple to be re-opened at Edessa, although with 
the – by then – usual proviso that no sacrifices were carried out there.
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In the context of this complex history of interaction between the Late Roman 
state and “pagan” religious institutions, the following exemplary events can be 
summarily described:
The removal of the Altar of Victory from the Roman Senate: With deep roots in 
Roman history and self-understanding, the cult of Victoria/Victory grew in impor-
tance in Rome through the Punic Wars to the end of the civil wars that ended the 
Republic (the famous temple to Victory erected on the Palatine Hill in 284 BCE, and 
the altar with statue in the Senate, begun by Julius Caesar and completed by Octa-
vian in 29 CE). Senators swore allegiance to the state of Rome at the Altar of Vic-
tory, and each sitting of the Senate was opened by a sacrifice of incense on the Altar. 
Under the sons of Constantine, the Altar was to suffer removal, restoration, and 
eventual destruction: first removed from the Senate by Constantius II, restored to its 
place during the “pagan” revival under Julian, then removed again in 382 by Gratian 
(the latter the more enthusiastic of the anti-“pagan” Christian emperors). After Gra-
tian’s death in battle, the leading Roman senator and urban prefect, Quintus Aurelius 
Symmachus, wrote a petition to the new western emperor Valentinian II to request 
the restoration of the Altar of Victory. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, countered Sym-
machus’s petition to the emperor with letters of his own (which carried the day and 
led to the petition denied). At stake in the literary debate was not the Altar of Victory 
as such, but the nature of religion, and whether traditional religious practices by its 
very essence involved sacrifices which are sites of ritual and moral pollution (as was 
argued by Ambrose). The underlying issue was Gratian’s withdrawal of state fund-
ing for traditional cults, in defense of which Symmachus argued that
“[t]hus we ask for peace for the gods of our fathers, the gods of our 
native land. It is reasonable to believe that whatever is worshipped by 
each of us is ultimately one and the same. We gaze at the same stars, we 
share the same sky, the same universe surrounds us.”
(Third Relation, 10)76
Earlier in the Relation Symmachus puts his petition squarely within the frame of 
tradition:
“But even if the avoidance of such an omen were not sufficient, it would 
at least have been seemly to abstain from injuring the ornaments of the 
Senate House. Allow us, we beseech you, as old men to leave to posterity 
what we received as boys. The love of custom is great” 
(Third Relation, 6) (my emphasis).
In addition, Symmachus refers to the visit of Constantius II to Rome in 357 CE in 
glowing terms as one of admiration for traditional culture:
He diminished none of the privileges of the sacred virgins, he filled the priestly 
offices with nobles, he did not refuse the cost of the Roman ceremonies, and  
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following the rejoicing Senate through all the streets of the eternal city, 
he contentedly beheld the shrines with unmoved countenance, he read the 
names of the gods inscribed on the pediments, he enquired about the origin 
of the temples, and expressed admiration for their builders. Although he 
himself followed another religion, he maintained its own for the empire, for 
everyone has his own customs, everyone his own rites. The divine Mind has 
distributed different guardians and different cults to different cities.77
At stake was a number of converging issues: the relationship between the 
emperor and the Roman Senate, at a point in history where much of the political 
centre of gravity had already shifted East, and in particular was focused in Con-
stantinople; the myth-history of “pagan” cult, in particular here the Altar of Vic-
tory, as stand-in for the deep history of Roman imperial tradition; and in general, 
the upholding of venerated traditions in a context of fairly rapid cultural changes.
The decline and destruction of the Artemision in Ephesus: As one of the famed 
seven wonders of the ancient world, and a temple cult that exerted religious and 
cultural influence beyond the province of Asia Minor, the Artemision of Ephesus 
was already in decline by the time Theodosius I ordered the temples closed in 391 
CE. Roughly 150 years previously the Artemision suffered despoliation by the 
marauding Goths who sacked the city, looted the temple treasury, and burnt the 
temple down in 262 CE as part of a wider looting incursion into the eastern prov-
inces of the Roman Empire. The temple was rebuilt but it did not retain its previ-
ous brilliance as it was only partially rebuilt, and then with material derived from 
ruined parts of the building. Nevertheless, it remained in use as a cultic centre 
throughout the 4th century. In the meantime the Artemision featured as focus in 
anti-pagan invective, for instance in the second century apocryphal Acts of John, 
where in an episode recounting the apostle John’s visit to Ephesus, the altar of 
Artemis broke into many pieces, temple objects fell to the ground, and the image 
of the deity broke into pieces, part of the temple tumbled in killing the priest – all 
on the preaching of the apostle (37–47), thus prefiguring in imagined, narrated 
discourse the kinds of destruction wrought on pagan temples later.
The account is dramatized further in the Syriac History of John, the Son of 
Zebedee, the Apostle and Evangelist (46) where the crowds acclaim that
[w]e renounce this Artemis, in whom there is no use. . . . And the whole 
crowd cast cords about the image of Artemis, and pulled it down, and 
dragged it along, whilst bands were crying out before it and behind it: 
“Thou destroyer of our lives, arise, deliver thyself! Not from heaven 
didst thou descend; artisans made thee in a furnace.”78
While parts of the Artemision were systematically carted off to adorn imperial 
building projects elsewhere, and thus by the beginning of the 5th century was 
already in a state of high disrepair,79 it is the visit of John Chrysostom to Ephesus 
in 401 that is generally recounted as the moment of the final “destruction” of the 
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temple. According to contemporary encomia, John Chrysostom was hailed as “the 
destroyer of demons and overthrower of the temple of Artemis,” and in the writ-
ings of the Christian poets Prudentius (Against Symmachus, 2.495)80 and Paulinus 
of Nola (Poem 10.95)81 John Chrysostom is exulted as the one who finally made 
Artemis yield to Christ (Paulinus may have played in his poem on both John the 
apostle, and the Christian rhetor, John Chrysostom). Chrysostom’s “overthrow” 
of the temple may have amounted to no more than achieving success in stopping 
the continued cultic veneration of the deity, but the rhetor Libanius (who, ironi-
cally was Chrysostom’s teacher), gives evidence to the widespread despoliation of 
churches by marauding bands of monks in his address to the emperor Theodosius 
to preserve ancient temples being destroyed:
[The emperor has] not ordered the temples to be shut up, nor forbidden 
any to frequent them: nor have you driven from the temples or the altars, 
fire or frankincense, or other honours of incense, [yet monks run to them] 
bringing with them wood, and stones, and iron, and when they have not 
these, hands and feet. . . . the roofs are uncovered, walls are pulled down, 
images are carried off, and altars are overturned: the priests all the while 
must be silent upon pain of death. When they have destroyed one temple 
they run to another, and a third, and trophies are erected upon trophies: 
which are all contrary to law. This is the practice in cities, but especially 
in the countries.
(Or. 30.7–8)82
The core of Libanius’s argument is not only that it is against imperial legislation 
to destroy temples and shrines, but also that the religious sites themselves have 
formed the foundation of the very empire of which Theodosius is himself the 
emperor. The greatness of the Empire is enshrined in these monumental religious 
edifices. The marauding monks saw it differently.
The destruction of the Serapeum in Alexandria: In 391 CE a Christian crowd 
under the leadership of the patriarch, Theophilus, attacked and destroyed the Sera-
peum in Alexandria and other pagan shrines in the city. The Serapeum was the 
biggest sanctuary in Alexandria and one of the most famous in antiquity. The pres-
tige of the cult of Sarapis had to do, apart from the impressive site itself – a huge 
raised temenos and a richly adorned interior – also with the impressive mechanics 
of the cult building: a mechanical device caused tremors when one approached the 
statue of Sarapis (thus putting in effect the warning that touching the cult statue 
will set off an earthquake), hollow statues from which cult attendants blew trum-
pets and loudhailed commands, as well as a magnetic effect that kept a sun orb 
floating above the statue, in addition to the traditional Nilometer (the measure that 
showed the risen level of the Nile during flood) that was kept in the site as indica-
tion of Sarapis as protector of the annual Nile floods. So great was the presence of 
the sanctuary in the city that Eunapius could state: “For, on account of its temple 
of Serapis, Alexandria was a world in itself, a world consecrated by religion.”83
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The Christian riot was sparked off by a preceding riot by pagan Alexandri-
ans. This was caused by the fact that a nearby public basilica that stood in disre-
pair was given to the patriarch for use by the growing Christian community. The 
basilica stood on underground rooms that had previously been discovered to have 
housed Mithraic groups. The Christians now paraded these cult items through 
the street with taunts directed at the pagan population. The pagans reacted by 
rioting through the city, capturing a number of Christians and keeping them hos-
tage in the Serapeum where they blockaded themselves in. When the army inter-
vened, the pagans appealed to the emperor, Theodosius, for justice. The imperial 
response elevated the Christians who died to martyrdom and provided clemency 
to the pagan rioters: “Litigation about the rest of the evils and roots of the discord, 
whatever had come forth in behalf of the defense of images, was not to be pressed. 
After these issues had been removed, the cause of the war would be removed” 
(Rufinus, Hist. eccl. 11.22).84 It is, arguably, the latter phrase that sparked off the 
Christian riot. When earlier Theodosius had said that the “vain superstition of the 
pagans” had caused the riot in the first place, the crowd took the phrase to mean 
that the cult images had to be removed and destroyed. What Theodosius probably 
meant was that the pagans images that the Christians paraded through the city 
had caused the riot and that this offence should be stopped. Nevertheless, the end 
result is that the Christians attacked the temple grounds, axed off the head of the 
cult statue of Sarapis, tore the statue apart and burnt the torso in the amphitheatre. 
“Thus all over the world the shrines of the idols were destroyed,” ended Theo-
doret of Cyrrhus his description of the destruction of the Serapeum.85
The Praetorian Prefect Oriens, Tatian, probably exercized a moderating influ-
ence over Theodosius in effecting a conciliatory response to the riot in Alexandria 
by pointing to the economic and political power of the local Hellenic elites in 
Egypt and elsewhere – “paganism was the hegemonic culture of Alexandria at the 
beginning of our period”.86 As hegemonic culture, Alexandrian paganism was an 
undifferentiated community, that is, pagan religious life was barely distinguish-
able from civic institutions.87 In this kind of situation, a pax deorum (not only as 
toleration for the gods of others, but also as toleration for ancient cultural tradi-
tions) is necessary for maintaining social cohesion and harmony. If it was true for 
the most part of its history, that a wide variety of pagan cultic communities could 
exist side by side, and that even Christians and Jews could share in this discourse 
space – the evidence of Greek philosophical schooling highly visible in Christian 
theologians like Origen and Clement – the break came with the imperial anti-
pagan legislation that for the first time constructed “paganism” as a counterpart to 
Christianity, and made “paganism” visible as paganism. “The city’s pagans began 
to act in concert as they sought to preserve their status against the encroachments 
of the Christian community,” as Haas puts it. (In spite of this constructed bifurca-
tion, Christian discourse and “pagan” discourse continued to mutually inflect each 
other: as Glen Bowersock argued with respect to the cult of Aion in Alexandria, 
with the iconography of Aion as the pagan counterpart of Jesus – his festival the 
counterpart of the Christian Epiphany, celebrating the birth from a virgin of the 
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pagan god – as an example of Christianity impacting on pagan traditions and 
conceptualities.)88
If this reconstruction is plausible, then a root cause for the symbolic revolt in 
Alexandria can be identified in an intense identity conflict and social struggle 
between an educated Greek elite and a demos of disenfranchised (mostly) Chris-
tian population. This is not to reduce the conflict to a simple one of rich versus 
poor, educated to uneducated, but to understand the way in which a magnificent 
cult like this could be sustained to function: it is only by being embedded in the 
power relations in the city, with the rich, the civic elites and authorities, paying 
for the upkeep and festival outlays, that the cult could continue being a symbol 
for something else, namely an ordering of society that was being upended in the 
course of the 4th into the 5th century. The previous visits of the praetorian prefect 
of the East, Maternus Cynegius, a zealous promoter of the Theodosius legislation 
against pagan temple institutions and cultic practices (he had closed a number of 
temples elsewhere in the East), primed the atmosphere in Alexandria with expec-
tation of a final showdown to come.
Some of the roots in the conflict lay much earlier: indirect evidence exists for 
the formation of the earliest Christian groups in Alexandria in the context of Jew-
ish baptismal movements, that is, in movements of social dissociation, or coun-
ter-cultural movements, a context that inflected the discourse production of early 
Christians in Alexandria for the first three centuries of their presence there.89 The 
regular rioting affecting the Jewish communities (leading to their eventual almost 
disappearance from Alexandria) was attributed to the presence of “Galileans,” 
that is apocalyptic-minded Christians bent on disrupting pagan cultic worship and 
culture. Christians were caught up, from the beginning of the Christian mission 
in Alexandria, in the intergroup violence that escalated after the Roman admin-
istration introduced the poll tax on non-Greeks, in which unfolding of events the 
Jews petitioned for full citizenship during the reign of Claudius (and thus seek-
ing out the Roman side in opposition to the Greeks and native Egyptians) – and 
suffered a pogrom for it. Reversals of status combined with violence suffered 
against the group call into question the very compact that made possible the (even 
though often troubled) coexistence of disparate ethnic groups in the same geo-
graphic locality. The anomic situation in which early Christian cult groups found 
themselves contributed to a cosmological revolt represented by one part of these 
traditions that are both a reflection of what is happening “on the ground” and the 
discourse that continues to inspire social revolt in circumstances that are dire.90 As 
Henry Green puts it (in the larger context of the origins of Egyptian Gnosticism as 
a discourse of “cosmological revolt”):
The initial gravitation by urban Jews, Greeks, and Egyptians to Chris-
tianity was a product of their anomic situation. In contrast, by the late 
second century, Christianity in Egypt progressively appealed to urban 
educated Greeks and non-Egyptians. It would require nearly another 
century, however, before significant numbers of rural Egyptian peasants 
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became Christians. The spread of Christianity from social class to social 
class and from urban areas to rural environments is tied also to the socio-
economic development of Roman Egypt. The fragmentation of Roman 
ideology and economy in Egypt and the institutionalization of Christian 
belief systems and social organizations are highly correlated.91
The destruction of the Serapeum as an iconic event constituted for Christians 
a final statement of the status reversal implied by early Christian visions of the 
end (vide the end of the book of Revelation). The triumphalist mockery sounding 
through Christian accounts of temple despoliations (“Sarapis was a nest of mice,” 
said Theodoret; “For surely it is a grave impiety indeed, that holy places should 
be defiled by the stain of unhallowed impurities,” Eusebius, “Letter of Constantine 
to Eusebius,” Life of Constantine 3.52),92 the identification of the cult objects and 
deities with demons and pollution, the statement of Theodoret with respect to 
Marcellus of Apamea’s temple destructions: “No sooner did the multitude hear of 
the flight of the hostile demon than they broke out into a hymn of praise to God,”93 
would resound again in a modern time and in the same world.
The Taliban and the Buddhas of Bamiyan; ISIS and the 
Tomb of Jonah
The Taliban and the Buddhas of Bamiyan: In an act of “archaeological terror-
ism” the supreme leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammed 
Omar, announced in early 2001 the impending destruction of the two colossal 
statues of Buddha in Bamiyan Province, 230 kilometres (150 miles) from the 
capital of Kabul.94 Mullah Omar issued a ruling, on 26 February 2001, shortly 
before the destruction began against un-Islamic graven images, which means all 
idolatrous images of humans and animals. Despite worldwide condemnation and 
pleas to refrain from doing so, on the grounds of the heritage value of the statues 
(it is a World Heritage site), and from the side of Muslim clerics elsewhere that 
Mullah Omar’s interpretation of Islamic law is wrong-headed and damaging 
to the image of Islam, on 2 March the Taliban started the destruction. When 
anti-aircraft and tank fire did not succeed in breaking up the Buddhas, truck-
loads of dynamite were brought in to complete the destruction. Kofi Annan, the 
then United Nations Secretary-General, met with the Taliban’s foreign minister, 
Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, in Islamabad in an attempt to save what was widely 
valued as prime examples of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage. The Taliban stood 
firm and even held that all other “moveable statues” – including more than a 
dozen smaller Buddha statues in the Kabul Museum – had also been destroyed.95 
In a scene reminiscent of the Christian mobs destroying pagan temples, as one 
observer stated: when the Buddhas finally crumbled, Taliban fighters “were 
firing weapons into the air, they were dancing and they brought nine cows to 
slaughter as a sacrifice.”
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What are the Buddhas of Bamiyan? The “Buddhas” refer to two colossal stat-
ues of the Buddha (the taller one standing about 53m tall, represented the Buddha 
Vairocana, the “Light Shining throughout the Universe Buddha”; the lesser statue 
of 36m, the Buddha Sakyamuni) cut into the sandstone cliffs facing the Bami-
yan valley between the two mountain ranges of the Hindu Kush and the Koh-i-
Baba, somewhere between the 3rd and 5th centuries CE. The original statues were 
impressive, as we learn from early descriptions:
visible for miles, with copper masks for faces and copper-covered hands. 
Vairocana’s robes were painted red and Sakyamuni’s blue. These tower-
ing, transcendental images were key symbols in the rise of Mahayana 
Buddhist teachings, which emphasized the ability of everyone, not just 
monks, to achieve enlightenment.96
The site of the Buddhas in the long Kabul valley, but Afghanistan in general, 
was historically a place of stopover on travels along the Silk Road, connecting 
the various empires of India, China, Sassanian Persia, and later also the Mus-
lim caliphates of Rashidun and then the Ummayads. It is particularly during the 
existence of the Kushan Empire (roughly 2nd century BCE to 3rd century CE), 
which spanned the current Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and stretched into 
northern India, that a syncretistic culture and religious environment developed in 
an empire that thrived commercially and culturally. Buddhists, Jains, Hindus, and 
Zoroastrians were present and established centres of learning. There is some evi-
dence of Judaeo-Persians and Manichaeans, and later Nestorian Christians were 
also established in monasteries. The emergence of Mahayana Buddhism saw the 
establishment of monasteries amassing great wealth from endowments such that 
they were able to fund artworks and exerted a visual presence in the landscape 
with numerous stupas and images of Buddhist deities in the style now known as 
Gandharan Buddhist Art.97
In the context of the historical encounters, the Muslim conquerors of the 7th 
century onwards always had a difficult relationship to the Buddhists in the greater 
Afghanistan region. Even though they extended protection to other “religions of 
the Book” (and Buddhism certainly was one, and was also against idolatry), Mus-
lims were hostile to Buddhists, calling them idol worshippers. Thus the Buddhists 
found themselves on the receiving end of constant repression. In more contem-
porary times, the caves around the Buddhas, where in centuries before Buddhist 
monks stayed, now refugees from the wars in Afghanistan took cover. And the 
area itself is contaminated by the fact that it lies at a point where some of the 
fighting for Kabul was fiercest in the armed conflict of various actors against 
the Taliban:
Bamiyan was a base of the Taliban’s opposition – Northern Alliance’s 
“rebel” forces led by ousted Afghani President Borhanuddin Rabbani. 
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How could the Taliban better humiliate the locals than to destroy their 
heritage? An earlier attempt to destroy the Buddhas came when the Tali-
ban took control of Bamiyan in 1998. Then, the local Taliban governor 
talked the military commander out of the atrocity.98
Nevertheless, as Richard Foltz puts it, in spite of the area’s rich cultural history 
into which treasury a range of religious traditions contributed, after the Islamiza-
tion of the Silk Road, it was a melting pot no more. And herein lies part of the 
answer to the violence done to the Bamiyan Buddhas: the Taliban excized the 
other symbolically and physically from the landscape to achieve a “pure land” 
remaining.99
ISIS and the Tomb of Jonah: The case of ISIS and the destruction of the tomb 
of Jonah is equally a tale of entwinement of religion, culture, and politics.100 
The tomb of Jonah in Mosul is, according to very old tradition, the place where 
the prophet Jonah was buried after his preaching mission to Nineveh, as nar-
rated in the Hebrew Bible. Present-day Mosul lies on the site of the ancient 
Assyrian city of Nineveh, and according to old legend, Jonah was buried in the 
city, in a site called Tell Nebi Yunus, or Hill of the Prophet Jonah. In pre-Chris-
tian literature the burial site of Jonah was identified somewhere in Palestine, 
but since early Christianity this was a pilgrimage site where a church was built 
over the purported burial place. The church was converted to a mosque after 
the Muslim conquest, and the present (destroyed) structure dated from the 14th 
century. The mosque also housed relics connected to Jonah, such as remnants 
of the whale that swallowed him as well as one whale tooth. The destruction 
of the heritage site was again met with widespread condemnation, since Jonah 
was, after all, a figure core to all three monotheistic book religions, Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam.101 This was, however, not the only symbolic cleans-
ing taking place. In the month preceding, ISIS fighters destroyed a number of 
other Sunni holy sites in Mosul, as well as seven Shiite places of worship in the 
predominantly Shiite Turkmen city of Tal Afar, about 31 miles (50 kilometres) 
west of Mosul.102
The destruction of holy sites is not an act of arbitrary, willful violence aimed at 
cultural heritage in the region. It is very much embedded in and flowing from the 
history of the rise of ISIS in Iraq. The aim of ISIS was to re-establish an end-time 
caliphate in the region of Syria-Iraq with a capital in the city of Raqqa, an ancient 
settlement largely refounded in Hellenistic times and remaining an important city 
through Roman, Byzantine, and Muslim periods of control into the present day. 
Part of the allure of the city was its strategic role as capital of the Ummayad Cali-
phate at the transition from the 8th to 9th centuries into the Abbasid Caliphate. 
The caliphate was called out in 2014 with the installation of Abubakr al-Baghdadi 
as caliph. The purpose of establishing the caliphate is to create a space for the 
end-time clash between “Rome” (= Christianity) and Islam, as well as to provoke 
the final eschatological showdown.103 In the eschatological lore that animates ISIS 
ideologically, the city of Dabiq in northern Syria near the Turkish border will be 
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the site of the end-time apocalyptic war. In the Shahih Muslim Hadith the unfold-
ing of end-time events are portrayed:
Abu Huraira reported Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) as 
saying: The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at 
al-A’maq or in Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the 
people of the earth at that time will come from Medina (to counteract 
them). . . . And when they would come to Syria, he would come out while 
they would be still preparing themselves for battle drawing up the ranks. 
Certainly, the time of prayer shall come and then Jesus (peace be upon 
him) son of Mary would descend and would lead them in prayer. When 
the enemy of Allah would see him, it would (disappear) just as the salt 
dissolves itself in water and if he (Jesus) were not to confront them at all, 
even then it would dissolve completely, but Allah would kill them by his 
hand and he would show them their blood on his lance.104
These are, however, not decontextual, unanchored millennial apocalyptic imagi-
naries. ISIS emerged from the chaos that enveloped Iraq following the 2003 US-
led invasion and subsequent breakdown of any semblance of functioning polity 
(some ISIS leaders, like Baghdadi himself, were inmates of the American prison 
Camp Bucca in Iraq at the end of the military invasion). In fact, it is a declared 
intention of ISIS to establish a caliphate without borders, in that it refuses to 
acknowledge the national borders that were established in the wake of the disin-
tegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War in 1918. It is 
particularly the infamous secret Sykes-Picot agreement between France and Brit-
ain (with the approval of Russia) which divided up the ex-Ottoman territories into 
national states regardless of internal tribal cohesions, as well as into dominions 
and spheres of influence – the post-1920 history of Iraq was a particularly tragic 
example of this, basically being turned into a giant extraction field by France 
and Britain. Hence the view of the Sykes-Picot legacy as example of Western 
imperialism, but also that the borderless ISIS (that refuses to understand itself nor 
function as a normal state) is intent on restoring the original idea of Umma as the 
community of Muslims.105 It was the traumatic experience of the invasion of Iraq 
and its aftermath that caused many to see the signs of the end all around them – the 
time for the end-time apocalypse was at hand.
By deliberately hearkening back to and re-enacting Salafi theology and practice, 
ISIS is turning the clock back to the earliest purest period of Islam. The Salafis 
or Wahhabis are an austere form of Islamic faith and practice oriented around a 
very literal interpretation of the Qur’an.106 This is an Islamic theology that regards 
all innovation not accounted for in the earliest layers of tradition as idolatry, tak-
fir, among which veneration of saints, seeking their intercession, and visiting their 
tombs, all of which are considered idolatry (shirk), impurities, and innovations in 
Islam (bid’ah). In this sense, all Muslims who do not hold to a strict practice are 
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declared non-Muslim in the eyes of ISIS (this counts for more than 200 million 
Shiite Muslims, and most of the Sunni world).
On a practical level, since the earliest days of Wahhabism, “archaeological 
terrorism” has been practiced against all religious installations and practices not 
allowed for in the Qur’an or earliest traditions. Upon the conquest of Medina, all 
the sites related to the family of the Prophet (except his own house) were razed, 
and in more recent times, Salafists in Saudia Arabia and elsewhere have been 
systematically destroying remnants of Islamic religious buildings and sites from 
the Ottoman era. It is a large-scale symbolic cleansing of any accruals to the faith 
and practice not accounted for in the Qur’an. In this manner ISIS projects a self-
understanding of being back in the beginning years of Islam, being a small com-
munity of true believers amidst a large surrounding society of non-Muslims, in a 
state of takfir. The caliphate, then, is not just a political entity but also a vehicle for 
salvation. In this jihadist vision of ISIS, and jihadism is envisioned as a permanent 
state of religious obeisance, “the End of Days is a leitmotif of its propaganda.”107 
The Qur’an itself is intensely interested in the events of the last days plotting out 
the various signs of the end-time, even if it does not offer a coherent narrative of 
end-time events (the Hadith literature is even more interested in the end-time): 
the appearance of the Dajjal (the Muslim Antichrist), the return of Jesus to fight 
and kill him, the appearance of the Mahdi (the Sunni Muslim messianic figure), 
the appearance of the beast from the Earth, the rising of the sun from the west, 
the appearance of Yajuj and Majuj (the biblical Gog and Magog), and the final 
destruction of the world – these events herald the Day of Judgement.108
In the official magazine of ISIS, Dabiq Issue 7 of 1436 A.H., the essay “The 
Extinction of the Grayzone” puts the point across very well. The “grey zone” is 
the state in which Muslims live in the world, not only in Western societies but also 
in majority Muslim countries.109 Here they have to conform to state laws and cul-
tural customs, and show allegiance to their host nations and communities, hence 
the picture on the cover page of Muslims carrying cards reading “Je suis Charlie,” 
in solidarity with the French after the Charlie Hebdo murders. This grey zone is 
“the hideout of hypocrites.”110 This is the zone where Muslims waver between full 
adherence to Islam and conversion to Western religion (by implication, Christi-
anity). Since the Prophet is understood in the Qur’an as a divider, there does not 
exist a real possibility for existence as Muslim in the grey zone:
The destruction of the grayzone is comparable to the division resulting 
from the Islamic message when it was first conveyed by the Messenger 
(sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam). As the angels said when they appeared 
before the Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) while he was sleeping, 
“Muhammad is a divider” and “Muhammad divided the people” [Sahīh 
al-Bukhārī].111
The terror attacks in recent years in France, London, Brussels, and Madrid, to 
name a few, have the purpose to put “grayzone” Muslims on the spot and force 
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them to choose either apostasy or return to the Salafist Islam of ISIS and join the 
end-time struggle. Hence the title of the issue, which offers a commentary on 
the picture on the front cover, “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy.” In the vision of 
the author of the Dabiq article, immersion in Western society is to be a hypocrite 
or an about-to-be apostate. The capitalist West with its military and economic 
power, and concomitant deviant and debased lifestyle, is the embodiment of 
Shaytan or the Dajjal (the Antichrist).
Thus, violence directed at religious institutions and persons is but an enactment 
of the process of the struggle of the End of Days on the way to Paradise. The 
Taliban in Afghanistan and ISIS in Iraq and Syria have been acting out a similar 
programme of purifying the land and impressing on the religious landscape a stark 
division between good and evil – it is an unmixing of the mixed state, to which 
is precisely what the programme of ISIS, announced as the “extinction of the 
grayzone,” amounts.112
Conclusion
Four case studies traced the contours of symbolic revolts issuing in violence and 
destruction, the violent reordering of social spaces, across four very different con-
texts and periods. Shimmering below the surface is the fact that all four cases 
involved an apocalyptic, millennial vision of a kind. It is a typical misconception 
to understand apocalypticism, millennialism, and eschatology as things pertaining 
to the end of time – even if eschatology means the lore about the end. Millennial-
ism and apocalypticism are imaginaries of the now, symbolic revolts in discourse 
and conceptuality that, at some point, can translate – and in certain contexts does 
translate – into physical revolts. Hence the almost overly many examples of vio-
lent millennialist movements.113 Millennialism is a strongly evaluative social dis-
course, embodying strong sentiments of disaffection, dissociation, and alienation. 
It is shaped and intensified by heightened concentration on practices of purifi-
cation and dedication to divine purpose as reconstructed and reimagined by the 
affected group through strategies of remythologization and re-traditionalization – 
typical of apocalyptic imaginaries is a conceptual repristination of an earlier 
period of greater purity, whether this purity be ethnic, moral, or ideological.
In studies of apocalypticism and millennialism114 it is the conditions of social 
alienation and marginalization that feed millennialist worldviews, and in which 
they get established and deeply rooted. It is from these conditions that the senti-
ment arises that “the world stinks,” a strong sense of aversion that manifests in an 
imagination of a catastrophic end to the world as it is, and a catastrophic process 
of restoration, which is labelled “catastrophic millennialism.”115 The imagina-
tion of a catastrophic end of the world as preparation for restoration is exactly a 
graphic explication of the negative affective relationship towards the surrounding 
context by those who adopt these apocalyptic visions. In comparative perspective, 
the introductory essay to the Oxford Handbook of Millennialism by Catherine 
Wessinger demonstrates the pervasive spread of such millennialist discourses 
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across cultures and contexts, but also that the conditions giving rise to these are 
very much comparable circumstances with comparable outcomes.
An apocalyptic worldview is essentially a violent worldview. The sentiments of 
disaffection projected on to the social context invite a strong emotional reaction 
and channelling of destructive energies towards what is seen as undesirable states 
of things obtaining in the world. Such a worldview is not only a social commen-
tary on the state of things, it is also implicitly a call to arms to marshal the troops, 
so to speak, in an attempt to eradicate the grey zone, the area of compromises that 
gets erased under the pressure of societies that bifurcate under identity, ideologi-
cal, and economic stresses and tensions. Purification is the “simplification” of the 
social aggregation.
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 113 Catherine Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently: From Jonestown to 
Heaven's Gate (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000); Catherine Wessinger, ed., 
Millennialism, Persecution, and Violence: Historical Cases, Peace and Conflict 
Resolution Studies (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000); Eugene V. Gal-
lagher, “Catastrophic Millennialism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism, ed. 
Catherine Wessinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27–43; Peter Schäfer 
and Mark R. Cohen, eds., Toward the Millennium: Messianic Expectations from the 
Bible to Waco, Studies in the History of Religions 77 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), especially 
the chapter on the Branch Davidians of Waco, but most of the case studies involve 
some kind of injurious end.
 114 The two terms actually denote the same phenomenon, so the use of both is redundant. 
“Millennialism” is the preferred term for sociologists, while “apocalypticism” is gen-
erally the preferred term for biblical scholars, theologians, and historians of religion.
 115 Gallagher, “Catastrophic Millennialism,” 28ff. The phrase, “the world stinks,” comes 
from a report on how an American informant expressed his pessimism of the world.
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